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Abstract—Structured P2P overlays provide a framework for
building distributed applications that are self-configuring, scal-
able, and resilient to node failures. Such systems have been suc-
cessfully adopted in large-scale Internet services such as content
delivery networks and file sharing; however, widespread adoption
in small/medium scales has been limited due in part to security
concerns and difficulty bootstrapping in NAT-constrained envi-
ronments. Nonetheless, P2P systems can be designed to provide
guaranteed lookup times, NAT traversal, point-to-point overlay
security, and distributed data stores. In this paper we propose a
novel way of creating overlays that are both secure and private
and a method to bootstrap them using a public overlay. Private
overlay nodes use the public overlay’s distributed data store
to discover each other, and the public overlay’s connections to
assist with NAT hole punching and as relays providing STUN
and TURN NAT traversal techniques. The security framework
utilizes groups, which are created and managed by users through
a web based user interface. Each group acts as a Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI) relying on the use of a centrally-managed
web site providing an automated Certificate Authority (CA). We
present a reference implementation which has been used in a P2P
VPN (Virtual Private Network). To evaluate our contributions,
we apply our techniques to an overlay network modeler, event-
driven simulations using simulated time delays, and deployment
in the PlanetLab wide-area testbed.
I. INTRODUCTION
While Structured P2P overlays provide a scalable, resilient,
and self-managing platform for distributed applications, their
adoption rate has been slow outside data distribution services
such as BitTorrent and eDonkey. General use of structured
P2P systems, especially in applications targeting homes and
small/medium businesses (SMBs), has been limited in large
part due to the difficult nature of securing such systems to the
level required by these users. Applications in home and SMBs
may need a greater level of trust than what can be guaranteed
by anonymous contributors in free-to-join overlays, but these
users lack the resources for bootstrapping private P2P overlays
particularly in constrained wide-area network environments
where a significant amount of or all peers are behind Network
Address Translation devices (NAT). This paper presents a
novel approach that enables virtual private overlays to be
created and managed by members of small/medium groups,
leveraging public overlays for bootstrapping, NAT traversal
and relaying.
There are many different P2P applications used in home
and small business, primarily for collaboration and sharing,
including data storage, media sharing, chat, and system main-
tenance and monitoring. Applications that currently provide
these functionalities fall into two categories: anonymous, fully
decentralized free-to-join P2P systems and distributed systems
with P2P communication that rely on a third party to provide
discovery and management. While using a third party service
provides a desirable level of trust for many users, it has
significant drawbacks such as vendor lock-in, which may result
in lost data, down time, and scalability constraints.
An example of a useful small business application that falls
into the latter category is LogMeIn’s [1] software products
LogMeIn Pro and Hamachi. LogMeIn Pro allows users to
remotely manage and connect with their machines so long as
they are willing to use LogMeIn’s software and infrastructure.
Hamachi allows users to establish decentralized VPN links
using centralized session management. Both applications assist
in the remote maintenance and monitoring of computers
without requiring the user to implement the networking in-
frastructure provided by LogMeIn.
Some examples of P2P applications for homes and small
businesses in development are P2PSIP and P2Pns. P2PSIP
enables users to initiate, through decentralized means, visual
and audio communication, while P2Pns allows users to deploy
a decentralized naming service. Both applications allow users
to contribute and benefit from all members of the system
without the regulation of a third party, but lack the ability to
allow users to centrally secure and manage their own subset
of the systems.
Distributed data store applications like Dynamo [2] and
BigTable [3] have the ability to store data using a completely
decentralized system. Though these systems are highly scal-
able and fault tolerant, the software uses an untrusted overlay.
Therefore all instances need to run in a secure environment,
whether that is in a single institution or across a largely
distributed environment using a VPN.
In this paper, we describe the architecture of a system
that attempts to balance the benefits of third party services
with P2P infrastructures. The main contribution of this pa-
per is the architecture of a P2P messaging framework that
integrates existing datagram-based security (Section III-A),
supports bootstrapping multiple virtual private overlays using
a public overlay to assist in NAT traversal (Section III-B), and
binds privacy and security together via a group infrastructure
(Section III-C). Our system relies on a completely open infras-
tructure using mechanisms that reduce the maintenance and
deployment burden that exist with decentralized P2P systems
without the loss of ownership due to use of third party systems.
The components of our system follow:
1) An application layer security system based upon an ex-
isting datagram-based transport security (DTLS) frame-
work to provide secure end-to-end (EtE) and point-to-
point (PtP) in P2P overlays1 while transparently han-
dling security concerns of relay NAT traversal.
2) The bootstrapping of private P2P overlays using existing
public overlays. The term ”public overlay” refers to
a free-to-join bootstrap overlay; nodes in the public
overlay are not required to have public IP addresses and
can be behind NATs.
3) A group web interface providing an automated front-end
handler for a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) that allows
users to create their own secure systems relying on P2P
overlays.
Our approach provides an easy mechanism to create trusted
overlays in constrained environments using a publicly avail-
able untrusted overlay as illustrated in Figure 1. Akin to
other virtualization techniques, the virtual private overlay
model allows developers to focus on the application, while
complexities associated with enforcing isolation and security
and messaging are abstracted away. This approach also has
benefits for system deployers, whereas insecure systems would
require modifying the overlay software to support security,
application level security, or the deployment of a decentralized
and scalable VPN in addition to the overlay software. Note,
that the usefulness of the public overlay could be nullified
if it does not employ some form of decentralized security as
described in [4].
Fig. 1. The use of a single, public overlay to bootstrap multiple, isolated
private overlays. The ring in the center is the public overlay. Each node in the
private overlay has a corresponding partner in the public pool; the relationship
is represented by a dashed line. A public overlay node can be multiplexed by
more than one private overlay.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II-A
provides background and related work. Section III describes
our contributions. In Section IV, we present different us-
age models and present a real system using the techniques
described in this paper, the GroupVPN. In Section V, we
described technical details of our implementation and use
1For our discussion a point-to-point or PtP relationship refers to direct
connections between two peers, such as a UDP or TCP socket; whereas, an
end-to-end or EtE relationship refers to messages passed through the overlay,
which may be routed over many PtP links.
models, simulators, and real systems to verify the utility of
our approach. We conclude the paper in Section VI.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we begin by reviewing structured P2P
overlays, followed by constraints that make the creation of
secure and private P2P overlays difficult, and related work.
A. Structured P2P Systems
Structured P2P systems provide distributed look up ser-
vices with guaranteed search time with a lower bound of
O(logN), in contrast to unstructured systems, which rely on
global knowledge/broadcasts, or stochastic techniques such
as random walks [5]. Some examples of structured systems
can be found in [6], [7], [8], [9], [10]. In general, structured
systems are able to make these guarantees by self-organizing
a structured topology, such as a 2D ring or a hypercube.
Each node is given a unique node ID. The node ID, drawn
from a large address space, must be unique to each peer, oth-
erwise address collisions will occur which can prevent nodes
from participating in the overlay. Furthermore, having the node
IDs well distributed assist in providing better scalability as
many algorithms for selection of shortcuts depend on having
node IDs uniformly distributed across the entire address space.
A simple mechanism to ensure this is to have each node use
a cryptographically strong random number generator. Another
mechanism for distributing node IDs involves the use of a
trusted third party to generate node IDs and cryptographically
sign them [4].
As with unstructured P2P systems, in order for an incoming
node to connect with the system it must know of at least
one active participant. A list of nodes that are running on
public addresses should be maintained and distributed with the
application, available through some out-of-band mechanism,
or possibly using multicast to find pools [6].
Depending on the protocol, a node must be connected to
closest neighbors in the node ID address space; optimizations
for fault tolerance suggest that it should be between 2 to
log(N) on both sides. Having multiple peers on both sides
assist in stabilizing the overlay structure when experiencing
churn, particularly when peers leave without warning.
Overlay shortcuts enable efficient routing in ring-structured
P2P systems. The different shortcut selection methods include:
maintaining large tables without using connections and only
verifying usability when routing messages [6], [9], maintaining
a connection with a peer every set distance in the P2P
address space [7], or using locations drawn from a harmonic
distribution in the node address space [8].
Most structured P2P overlays support decentralized stor-
age/lookup of information by mapping keys to specific node
IDs in an overlay. At a minimum, the data is stored at the
node ID either smaller or larger to the data’s node ID and
for fault tolerance the data can be stored at other nodes. This
sort of mapping and data storage is called a distributed hash
table (DHT) and is a typical component of most structured
P2P systems.
B. Constraints in Structured P2P Systems
1) Communication Between Nodes: There are two mech-
anisms for message routing in a P2P overlay: iterative or
recursive. In iterative routing, the sender of a packet will
contact each successive member in a path directly until it
find the destination node, at which point it sends the packet
directly to the destination. In recursive routing, messages are
sent through the overlay via forwarding from one peer to the
next until arriving at the destination. Iterative routing makes
NAT traversal complicated as peers create connections during
the routing of packets, which would require constant NAT
traversal mediation, whereas recursive routing provides stable
connections due to a single NAT traversal during the connec-
tion phase. In regards to security, Iterative routing can easily
be secured using stream and datagram based security such
as TLS [11] and DTLS [12], because the sender initiates all
messages; however, in recursive routing, EtE communication
cannot be secured in the same fashion by through socket-
based TLS and DTLS, the sender because messages are routed
through intermediate nodes.
2) Private and Secure Overlay Subsets: Though EtE au-
thentication and privacy is important for many applications,
it does not increase the reliability of the structured overlay.
In a free-to-join system, malicious peers can easily intercept
packets for eavesdropping or to discard or tamper with them.
To deal with this issue, each overlay node could participate
with a subset of other nodes in a secure system where each
member would maintain a routing table containing a subset of
those involved. Each node would have to distinguish between
the different messages, handing them to unique routers for
each group, handle connectivity of the subset during churn,
and providing a distributed data store for use by this subset.
Achieving this functionality can require substantial modifica-
tions to the core overlay messaging and storage primitives.
In this paper we advocate a virtualization approach that
multiplexes private overlays that provide the same abstraction
of the underlying public overlay, and thus can reuse core
overlay primitives without modifications.
3) NATs: Another key issue faced by P2P systems is the
handling of NATs. A recent study [13] has shown that 30%-
40% of nodes in P2P systems are behind NATs. In environ-
ments where there are NATs, iterative routing can be signifi-
cantly more difficult to deploy, since each message sent may
require multiple NAT traversals. There are a few types of NATs
that can be traversed to support bidirectional communication
through UDP-hole punching, known as STUN. The remaining
categories of NATs either do not support UDP-hole punching
due to how the NATs do port mapping or support only TCP
communication and block all UDP communication. In [14],
[15], the authors evaluated many common NAT boxes and
determined that UDP-hole punching works on approximately
82% of NAT devices and TCP-hole punching on at least
64% of NAT devices. Unlike UDP hole punching, many TCP
techniques require either super-user access or be configured
with external software packages that require super-user access.
Those that do not require super-user access require that the
NAT not block unsolicited components of the TCP three-way
handshake. The remaining devices require an intermediary or
relay to pass packets between the peers behind the NATs.
Relays or TURN style NAT traversal presents issues similar
to EtE communication in recursive routing, namely, each node
will authenticate itself with the relay, but they will not readily
be able to authenticate each other using socket-based TLS or
DTLS.
C. Related Works
BitTorrent [16], a P2P data sharing service, supports stream
encryption between peers sharing files. The purpose of BitTor-
rent security is not to keep messages private but to obfuscate
packets to prevent traffic shaping due packet sniffing. Thus
BitTorrent security uses a weak stream cipher, RC4, and lacks
peer authentication as symmetric keys are exchanged through
an unauthenticated Diffie-Hellman process.
Hamachi [17] provides central group management and a
security infrastructure through a Web interface. Their secu-
rity system has gone through two revisions as documented
in [18]. Initially peers learn of each other through Hamachi’s
central system, which leads to the creation of secure links. In
their original approach, they use a system similar to a Key
Distribution Center (KDC), which requires that all security
sessions initiate through Hamachi’s central servers. In the
latest version, this model has been retained but with the
addition of an external PKI, which avoids the man-in-the-
middle attack but with has the additional cost of maintaining
both an external CA and certificate revocation list (CRL).
Hamachi also supports STUN, or NAT hole punching, and
TURN style NAT traversal, though TURN requires the use of
Hamachi’s own relay servers. Because Hamachi is closed, it
disables users from hosting their own infrastructures including
session management and relay servers.
Skype [19], like P2PSIP, allows for decentralized audio
and video communication. Unlike P2PSIP, Skype is well-
established and has millions of users and is also closed.
While Skype does not provide documentation detailing the
security of its system, researchers [20], [21] have discovered
that Skype supports both EtE and PtP security. Though similar
to Hamachi, Skype uses a KDC and does not let users setup
their own systems.
The RobotCA [22] provides an automated approach for
decentralized PKI. A RobotCAs receives request via e-mail,
verifies that the sender’s e-mail address and embedded PGP
key match, signs the request, and mails it back to the sender.
RobotCAs are only as secure as the underlying e-mail infras-
tructure and provide no guarantees about the person beyond
their ownership of an e-mail address. A RobotCA does not
provide features to limit the signing of certificates nor does
it provide user-friendly or intuitive mechanisms for certificate
revocation.
Three approaches that propose a public overlay to create
sub-overlays are [23], [24], and [25]. The approach described
in [23] proposes the use of a universal overlay as a discovery
plane for service overlay. The argument is that a participant of
an overlay must support all services provided by that overlay
such as multicast, DHT, or distributed search. Our work has
the same foundations as this paper, but takes the idea further
by using the universal overlay for NAT traversal additionally
we provide mechanisms for applying PKI techniques for
PtP and EtE messaging in the service overlays. Similarly,
Randpeer [24] uses a common overlay along with a sub-
netting service to create individual networks for applications
and services, though the project has seen little activity and
lacks implementation details. Unlike the previous two, [25]
limits the sub-overlay for the purpose of establishing multicast
groups, though their approach lacks discussion on how nodes
discover and form a new overlay as such their approach is
limited to simulations.
Distributed data store applications like [2], [3] require
that all machines have symmetric connectivity additionally
like [26], suggesting the use of a third party application
to ensure trust amongst all overlay participants. This is an
example use case that is explicitly targeted by our system
on the presumption that there are not sufficiently easy to
use decentralized VPN software applications [27], [28] and
even if there were it is undesirable to have additional setup
requirements.
While there has been much research [4] in securing overlays
through decentralized mechanisms that attempt to prevent
collusion known as a Sybil attack [29], these mechanisms
do not create private overlays. One approach mentioned does
provide a natural lead into such environments by using of
a pay-to-use service to mitigate the chances of an overlay
attack, whereby the pay to use service uses a CA to sign
node IDs. The work does not describe how to efficiently
implement such a system. Other projects [30], [31] combine
trusted overlays with anonymous members, though it could be
reasonably argued these services are not applicable to small
or medium business, which would prefer to have a private
overlay. None of the works focus on how to apply such models
to systems that are constrained in network connectivity, e.g.
by NATs.
III. BOOTSTRAPPING SECURE AND PRIVATE OVERLAYS
In this section, we explain the individual components of our
contributions. We begin by describing the application of SSL-
derived protocols for EtE and PtP security in overlays, which
leads to how to reuse an existing public overlay to bootstrap
a private and secure overlay in a constrained environment.
We conclude with a discussion of how we combine the
components to secure group overlays through the use of a
group web interface to provide a user-friendly PKI.
A. Secure Overlays
Securing EtE and PtP communication in overlays using
iterative routing with servers using static IP addresses can
easily be done using TLS or DTLS with certificates bound
to the server’s static IP address. This approach does not port
well to systems that use recursive routing. First, TLS cannot
easily be used because overlay routing in NAT-constrained
environments is traditionally done through unreliable data-
grams and not through reliable streams. DTLS can be applied
because it supports lost and out of order messages, though
the implementation must support usage without a socket. The
problem then becomes how to deal with identity. In this
section, we discuss how to bind security protocols and a
certificate model to an overlay system.
The key to our approach is abstracting the communication
layer, making EtE and PtP traffic appear identical. In this
approach, all messages are datagrams, which are sent over
abstracted senders and receivers as filters illustrated in Fig-
ure 2. This allows us to use secure tunnels over these links
with no application changes.
Fig. 2. An example of the abstraction of senders and receivers using a EtE
secured chat application. Each receiver and sender use the same abstracted
model and thus the chat application requires only high-level changes, such as
verifying the certificate used is Alice’s and Bob’s, to support security.
Exchanged certificates need a mechanism to verify authen-
ticity. Like an Internet browser, this verification should happen
automatically with no user intervention. Typically for SSL-
derivatives, the certificates have the owner’s IP address or
domain name as part of the certificate’s common name field.
In our system, we bind the certificate to each individual node
ID. That way, a single certificate cannot be used for multiple
peers in the overlay, making it difficult for an adversary to
launch Sybil attacks.
1) Forming the Connection: In overlay systems, a peer’s
connection manager requests an outgoing connection to an-
other peer in the system. This triggers the creation of a socket
(UDP or TCP), which is wrapped in the abstracted sender
and receiver models. The abstracted models arrive into the
security handler, which authenticates in both directions and
creates a secure session. The session is wrapped in the same
abstracted model and presented to the overlay system as a
direct connection to the remote peer. To keep the system
abstract, the security model and the wrapped sockets know
nothing about the overlay, and so the overlay should verify
the certificate to ensure identity.
Because EtE communication is application-specific, it re-
quires a slightly different path. For that purpose, we have
a specific module that allows an application to request a
secure EtE sender. Once an application requests the sender,
the module passes a sender / receiver model to the security
handler, like in the PtP process. Once the security initialization
has completed, the resulting sender / receiver is verified auto-
matically for proper identity. If that succeeds, messages sent
using the EtE sender will arrive at the remote party, decrypted
and authenticated by the security handler, and delivered to
the overlay application, who will deliver to the remote party’s
handler for such messages. Since overlay applications will be
sending and receiving unencrypted as well as encrypted EtE
traffic, the handler must verify that the packet was sent from
a secure end point. This assumes that an application using an
overlay has already implemented verification of node ID to
some application mapping. For example, an application could
be aware that node ID X maps to user Y, therefore if a secure
message coming from node ID Z says that it is user Y, an
application should drop the packet.
2) Datagram Constraints: Since UDP is connectionless,
applications that use it can easily be victims of denial of
service attacks. This is because packets sent to the receiver can
have a spoofed source address, unless the outgoing gateway
prevents this from occurring. For each spoofed attempt, the
security system will maintain state, which can eventually be
overloaded. In TCP, this is hampered due to the three message
handshake, which verifies that a source address is not spoofed,
prior to creating security state for the connection. To reduce
the potential of these spoofing attacks prior to establishing a
secure connection, DTLS (like Photuris [32]) uses a stateless
cookie for each remote peer. In DTLS, the cookie is usually
based upon the remote peer’s IP and the current time. In our
model, which deals with abstracted systems and IP addresses
are likely to be NAT-translated, this approach does not work.
Though for PtP, it is possible to use the address and port
from which the remote peer last sent a message from. For
EtE traffic, the node ID can be used for cookie calculation.
Because we are building on existing senders and receivers
that already have state, we use the object’s memory pointer or
hash value instead. Though this leads us down a similar path
of denial of service found in TCP SYN attacks.
B. Private Overlays
The main components involved in the starting and main-
taining a private overlay are 1) dissemination of the security
credentials and its name, 2) connecting with and storing data
in the public overlay, and 3) discovering and connecting
with peers in the private overlay. Step 1) can be application-
specific; we propose a generic interface that is useful in many
applications, through the use of groups as described in Section
Section III-C. For 2), we presume the usage of a structured
overlay as described in Section II-A. In this section, we discuss
3), the steps involved in creating and connecting to a private
overlay after the user has obtained group information and has
connected to a public overlay.
To connect with and create a private overlay, the application
performs the following steps: 1) connect to the public overlay;
2) store node ID in the public overlay’s DHT at the private
group’s key; 3) query the public overlay’s DHT at the private
group’s key; 4) start an instance of the private overlay with the
well-known end points being the node IDs retrieved from the
DHT; and 5) upon forming a link with a member in the private
overlay, the node follows the standard approach for linking to
neighbors and shortcuts but using secure PtP links to restrict
connections to members of the private overlay.
The node should maintain membership in the public overlay
when connected with the private overlay. This is needed for
two reasons: first, so that other peers can discover the node
while following the same set of steps; and second, for NAT
traversal purposes, as discussed in the next paragraph. Because
the public overlay and its DHT provides a means for discovery,
nodes must maintain their node ID in the public overlay’s
DHT. A data inserter must constantly update the lease for the
data object, otherwise the data will be removed, due to the
soft state or leasing nature of DHT, whereupon (key, value)
pairs are removed after a lease has expired.
During the formation of the private overlay, peers may
find that they are unable to form direct connections with
other members of the private overlay even while using STUN
based NAT traversal. We propose two solutions to address this
problem: 1) to use TURN NAT traversal in the nodes overlay
as discussed in [28], and 2) use the public overlay as an
extra routing massive TURN infrastructure. The TURN NAT
traversal technique has both peers connect with each other’s
near neighbors in order to form a 2-hop connection with each
other. The 2-hop route can either be enforced through a static
route or through EtE greedy routing. Due to the abstractions
in the system, the public overlay can be treated as another
mechanism to create PtP links, thus while packets may use
EtE routing on the public overlay, the private overlay nodes
treat it as a PtP connection thus all communication is secured.
This approach can be further enhanced by allowing the private
overlay to apply the TURN NAT traversal technique to the
public overlay. To do this, the private overlay must be capable
of requesting a direct connection between its node and the
remote peer in the public overlay. This would trigger the
eventual creation of a 2-hop relay connection as presented in
Figure 3.
If overlays are small and have significant churn, it is
expected that data stored in the overlay’s DHT to be lost. This
can be improved by also supporting broadcast in the private
overlay. In this model, each peer acts as a storage point for all
data critical to itself. If another peer cannot successfully find
data stored at a specific key in the overlay, it can make use
of broadcast over the entire overlay in an attempt to find the
result. The technical details of our broadcast implementation
are described at the end of Section V-A and an evaluation of
our revocation approaches can be found in Section V-F.
During our evaluation, we discovered that in certain cases
the private overlay would not form a proper well-formed state
but rather more than one distinct overlays, creating a parti-
Fig. 3. Creating relays across the node address space, when direct con-
nectivity is not possible. Two members, A and B, desire a direct connection
but are unable to directly connect, perhaps due to NATs or firewalls. They
exchange private, 1, and public, 2, neighbor information through the private
overlay and connect to one of each other’s neighbors, creating an overlap.
The overlap then becomes a PtP relay path (represented by directed, dashed
lines), improving performance over routing across the entire overlay.
tioned overlay. The underlying issue was that the partitioned
overlays believed they were in a well-formed state and thus
never reviewed the DHT list to determine if there were peers
that should be their neighbors. This caused the overlay to
remain fragmented until either a new peer joined or enough
peers left causing the nodes to believe they are in a non-
well-formed state and require bootstrapping links. The reason
the issue even existed was that states of significant churn,
especially during a bootstrapping of a significant amount
of new nodes in the system, entries in the DHT list can
become partitioned, with each set of nodes potentially seeing
different lists. Eventually the lists stored in the DHT become
consistent, but at that point, the overlay would have already
been partitioned.
To proactively solve the partitioning issue, the node per-
forms the following steps: 1) continuously query the DHT; 2)
upon receiving the DHT query result, the node determines if
there is a peer with whom it should be connected to such as
that it is closer in the address space than any of its current
neighbors; 3) form a connection with that peer; and 4) the
system should automatically at this point in time realize the
network fragmentation and heal itself. In our system, this
involved creating a bootstrapping connection with the peer.
Upon a successful connection, the system automatically causes
the networks to heal.
C. Group Overlays
To establish trusted links, we use the PKI model, where a
centralized CA (for a group) signs all client certificates and
clients can verify each other without CA interaction by using
the CA’s public certificate. However, setting up, deploying, and
then maintaining security credentials can easily become a non-
negligible task, especially for non-experts. Most PKI-enabled
systems require the use of command-line utilities and setting
up your own methods for securely deploying certificates and
policing users. While this can be applied to an overlay, our
experience with real deployments indicates that usability is
very important, leading us to find a model with easy to user
interfaces. In this section, we present our solution, a partially
automated PKI reliant on a redistributable group based web
interface. Although this does not preclude other methods of
CA interaction, our experience has shown that it provides a
model that is satisfactory for many use cases.
1) Joining the Group Overlay: Membership of an overlay
maps a set of users as a group. This led us to applying the PKI
model to a group infrastructure. Using our system, a user can
host an individual or multiple groups per web site. The creator
of the group becomes the default administrator, and users can
request access to the group. Upon an administrator approving,
users are able to download configuration data containing
overlay information and a shared key used by the overlay
application to communicate securely with the web interface.
The shared key uniquely identifies the user to the web site
allowing the application to securely send certificate requests.
By default, the web site automatically signs all certificate
requests, though it is not limited to this model. Two other
approaches are 1) require the user to submit a request and
wait for an administrator to verify each request and 2) set a
maximum amount of automatic request signings then requiring
administrative approval for more.
As stated in Section III-A, the certificate request is bound
to the application’s node ID, which can be generated by the
CA or the application. Additionally in the group system, the
certificate also contains the user who made the request and
the group for which the certificate is valid. Not only does
this ensure that a single certificate can only be used for each
node instance, but it reduces the amount of state necessary to
revoke a user from a system. Specifically, to revoke a user,
the CA would only need to provide a signed revocation notice
containing the user’s name and not every one of the previously
signed certificates.
Upon receiving a signed certificate, the overlay application
can connect to the overlay where all PtP traffic will be secured
and, optionally, so can EtE traffic. It is imperative that any
operations that involve the exchanging of secret information,
such as the shared secret, be performed over a secure transport,
such as HTTPS, which can be done with no user intervention.
2) Handling User Revocation: Unlike decentralized sys-
tems that use shared secrets, in which the creator of the overlay
becomes powerless to control malicious users, a PKI enables
the creator to effectively remove malicious users. The methods
that we have incorporated include: a user revocation list hosted
on the group server, DHT events requesting notification of peer
removal from the group, and broadcasting to the entire P2P
system the revocation of the peer.
A user revocation list offers an out-of-band distribution
mechanism that cannot easily be tampered, whereas commu-
nication using the overlay can be hampered by Sybil attacks.
The revocation list is maintained on the Web site and updated
whenever an administrator removes a user, or a user leaves
the group. Additionally it can be updated periodically so that
a user can verify that the revocation list is up to date.
However, because the user revocation list requires central-
ization, users should not query it prior to every communication
nor periodically during conversations. In addition to support
for polling the revocation list, the use of the DHT and broad-
cast provides active notification of user revocation. Revocation
through the DHT method allows a peer to request notification
if another peer is revoked from the group. To subscribe for this
notification, the peer inserts its node ID at the peer’s revocation
notification key, which we represent as a hash of its node ID.
Upon revocation, the CA will first insert a revocation notice
at this key and then query the key for all node IDs notifying
each of them of the revocation. The insertion of the revocation
notice handles a race condition, where a peer may insert its ID
but never receive a notification. Thus after inserting the request
for notification upon revocation, the peer should ensure that
a revocation has not occurred by querying the DHT to verify
the non-existence of a CA revocation.
When the group is securing PtP traffic, the DHT approach
does not effectively seal the rogue user from the system
until all peers have updated the revocation list. A peer may
continuously connect to all peers in the system until they have
all queried the DHT key prior to verification. Due to this
issue, we consider an additional model in the group overlay: an
overlay broadcast, ensuring that all peers in the private overlay
do know about the revocation.
In Section V-F, we present more technical details and an
evaluation with focus on latency and network traffic of the
DHT and broadcast methods.
Because the security framework is based on PKI, another
approach that is also supported is the use of certificate revo-
cation lists (CRL) found in most CA systems. The advantage
of a CRL and revoking individual certificates is the ability to
remove a subset of a user’s node, particularly useful in the
case that the user was not malicious but that some of their
nodes had been tampered or hijacked.
IV. APPLICATIONS
In this section, we present applications and potential ways
to configure them to use a private overlay. The applications
we investigate include chat rooms, social networks, VPNs, and
multicast. The key to all these applications is that users can
easily host their own services and be discovered through the
use of a NAT-traversing, structured overlay network.
A. Chat Rooms
Chat rooms provide a platform for individuals with a com-
mon interest to find each other, group discussion, private chat,
and data exchange. One of the most popular chat systems for
the Internet is Internet Relay Chat (IRC). As described in [33],
IRC supports a distributed tree system, where clients connect
to a server, and servers use a mixture of unicast and multicast
to distribute messages. The issues with IRC are documented
by [34], namely, scalability due to all servers needing global
knowledge, reliability due to connectivity issues between
servers, and lack of privacy. Private overlays could be extended
to support the features of IRC and potentially deal with these
inherent issues. Each chat room would be mapped to a private
overlay and the public overlay would be used as a directory
to learn about available chat rooms and request access. Struc-
tured overlays do not require global knowledge and can be
configured to handle connectivity issues. Additionally, IRC by
default uses clear text messaging and even if security is used a
server will be aware of the content of the message, two issues
resolved by using PtP security in a private overlay chat room.
B. Social Networks
Social networks such as Facebook and MySpace provide
an opportunity for users to indirectly share information with
friends, family, and peers via a profile containing personal
information, status updates, and pictures. Most social network
structures rely on hosted systems, where they become the
keepers of user data, which creates privacy and trust concerns.
Private overlays can remove this third party, making users the
only owner of their data. For this model, we propose that each
user’s profile be represented by a private overlay and that each
of their friends become members of this overlay. The overlay
will consist of a secured DHT, where only writes made by the
overlay owner are valid and only members of the overlay have
access to the content stored in it. In addition to bootstrapping
the private overlays, the public overlay would be used as a
directory for users to find and befriend each other. For fault
tolerance and scalability, each user provides a copy of their
profile locally, which will be distributed amongst the private
overlay in a read-only DHT, therefore, allowing the user’s
profile to be visible whether they are offline or online. Each
user’s social network would than consist of the accumulation
of the individual private overlays and the public overlay.
C. P2P VPNs
As described in [28], private overlays enable P2P VPNs.
The most common type of VPNs are centralized VPNs like
OpenVPN, which requires that a centralized set of resources
handle session initialization and communication. Another ap-
proach taken by Hamachi and many others is to maintain a
central server for session initialization but allow communica-
tion to occur directly between peers and providing a central
relay when NAT traversal fails. Using a structured private
overlay allows users to host their own VPNs, where each VPN
end points is responsible for its own session initialization and
communication. The private overlay also provides mechanisms
for handling failed NAT traversal attempts via relaying.
D. Multicast
The topic of secure multicast has been a focus of much
research. Using an approach similar to CAN [25], a virtual
private overlay forms a ring where all nodes are members of
the multicast group with the additional feature that you can
trust that your audience is limited to those in the overlay.
The main advantage of such multicasting technologies would
be for wide-area, distributed multicast. Examples of such ser-
vices include light weight multicast DNS / DNS-SD (service
discovery), as well as audio and video streaming.
V. IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS AND EVALUATION
In this section, we describe our prototype implementation
of a secure, private overlay followed by evaluation to quantify
network overheads.
A. Our Implementation – Brunet
Our implementation uses the Brunet [35] library, which
is a P2P system based upon the concepts introduced by
Symphony [8]. Its topology is a one-dimensional ring, where
peers connect with up to the four peers closest to themselves
in both directions in the node ID space. Shortcuts are based
upon a harmonic distribution and the use of proximity [36].
The system supports distributed versions of STUN or hole-
punching and TURN-like or relay based NAT traversal [28].
The system uses a DHT as a distributed data store using
a replication algorithm that spreads a single key, value pair
throughout the ring as described in [37]. Additionally, the
overlay has support for autonomic [38] and manual creation
of single-hop connections and double-hop through relaying
when NATs prevent direct connections. Furthermore, we have
developed a P2P VPN on top of this stack, which has been
used for over three years to support a ad hoc distributed
grid [39], [40].
The focus of this paper is on security and the bootstrapping
of private pools. In the previous sections, we have abstracted
the implementation to generic overlays, while in this section,
we will present our experiences and lessons learned in ap-
plying security protocols to the overlay. To provide security,
we investigated two approaches: reusing OpenSSL’s DTLS
implementation or making our own platform-independent
DTLS using C# and cryptography routines provided by .NET.
Because we are sending messages over unreliable mediums
such as UDP sockets, relays, and an overlay, we could not
reuse SSL or TLS. Additionally we want EtE security for
relays and overlay communication, the security needed to be
implemented through a filter or more specifically through a
memory buffer and not a socket.
Fig. 4. The DTLS filter.
Implementation of an OpenSSL DTLS filter was non-
trivial, as documentation is sparse providing the possibility
for varied approaches. Traditionally, DTLS uses the DGRAM
(datagram) BIO (I/O abstraction) layer, which provides a
reliable UDP layer. Because we need a filter, so that we can
do both EtE and PtP traffic, we used one memory BIO for
incoming traffic and another for outgoing traffic. Memory
BIOs provide pipes using RAM: data written to the BIO
can then be read in a first in, first out ordering. Incoming
messages written to or outgoing messages read from the DTLS
read or write BIOs, respectively, are either encrypted data
packets or handshake control messages. Sending and receiving
clear text messages occur at the DTLS SSL object layer. The
pathway for sending a clear text packet begins with the user
performing an SSL write operation, retrieving the encrypted
data by performing a BIO read on the write BIO, and sending
the data over the network. At the remote end, the packet is
passed to the SSL state machine by performing a BIO write
on the incoming BIO followed by a SSL read; the result will
be the original clear text message. This process also needs to
handle control messages; we provide clear context in Figure 4.
As an aside, OpenSSL supports a SSL filter BIO, though it
will not work for this purpose as BIOs that are inserted are
expected to have two pipes, like a socket or two memory
buffers. Also the only benefit of using the filter BIO would be
that it manages auto-renegotiation, which can be implemented
in user code by monitoring time and received byte count.
Other operations such as certificate verification and cookie
generation are handled by SSL callbacks, which hook into
our security framework.
Fig. 5. Bounded Broadcast in range [x, y]
An important component of security is the handling of revo-
cations handled by our broadcasting mechanism. We call our
broadcasting model bounded-broadcast because it is capable
of broadcasting to a subset of nodes, though it is also capable
of broadcasting to the entire overlay. A bounded broadcast
uses the following recursive algorithm: Begin with node x
triggering a broadcast message over the region [x, y]. x has
F connections to nodes in the range [x, y]. Denoting the ith
such neighbor as bi, the node x sends a bounded broadcast
over a sub-range, [bi, bi+1), to bi, except the final neighbor.
Differently stated, bi is in charge of bounded-broadcasting in
the sub-range [bi, bi+1). If there is no connection to a node
in the sub-range, the recursion has ended. The final neighbor,
(bF ), is responsible for continuing the bounded broadcast from
[bF , y]. When a node receives a message to a range that
contains its own address the message is delivered to that node
and then routed to others in that range. Figure 5 shows how
this bounded broadcast forms a local tree recursively. The
time required for a bounded broadcast is O(log2 N) as shown
in [41]. To perform a broadcast on the entire overlay, a peer
performs the bounded-broadcast starting from its node ID with
the end address being the node ID immediately preceding its
own in the address space. Additionally for security purposes,
the revoked peer is removed from the set of neighbors,
thus they are never responsible for forwarding the message
onwards.
B. Experimental Setup
We use three quantitative methods to evaluate our proposed
approach: network modeling, simulation, and deployments on
an actual wide-area system, PlanetLab [42].
1) Network Modeling: To model our system, we imple-
mented an application that generates a structured overlay
with the usual dimensions found in our deployed steady
state systems: a system of size N with each peer having 3
near neighbors on both sides and O(.5 logN) shortcuts. The
modeler creates a fully connected system where shortcuts are
optimally chosen based upon their location in the node ID
space using a harmonic distribution. Once the model has been
fully generated, we use the Brunet routing code to model the
number of nodes visited and message latencies. We employ
the MIT King data set [43] to determine the pair-wise latency
between nodes. The MIT King data set consists of latency
between DNS servers distributed globally on the Internet.
Since the MIT King data set only covers 1740 nodes, for larger
networks we randomly distribute the nodes in the address
space placing multiple nodes at the same “physical” location
when necessary. The overhead due to security was modeled
by adding 3 round-trip latencies to prior to all connection
processes. This models the behavior of the 6-message DTLS
handshake used in the deployed code base.
2) Simulations: The approach described above estimates
time based upon a model that reuses the core routing algorithm
of the overlay code, but does not fully capture the dynamics
of the overlay such as state machines involved in connection
handling. To allow complete evaluation of our software stack,
we have also implemented a simulator using event-driven time
that faithfully reusing the entire overlay code base including
routing, security, DHT, and connection state machines. This
allows us to verify correct behavior in the overlay prior to
testing out on real systems, such as PlanetLab, as well as
to perform experiments in a controlled environment, which
simplifies the evaluation while still retaining the effects of a
wide-are distributed system. Like the network modeler, we
have also employed the MIT King data set [43] for pair wise
latency between peers. To run the simulations, we employed
Archer [39], which uses our P2P VPN software to form a
distributed computing grid. Because the network modeler is
very light weight, it can model more than 100,000 peers using
a single computer; however, the simulator reuses the entire
overlay software and can only simulate around 1,000 peers.
3) PlanetLab: PlanetLab [42] is a consortium of research
institutes sharing hundreds of globally distributed network and
computing resources. PlanetLab provides a very interesting
environment as there is constant unexpected churn of machines
due to the extreme load placed on the resources and unsched-
uled system restarts. Complementary to simulation, PlanetLab
gives us a glimpse of what to expect from the P2P software
stack when used in an actual environment subject to higher
variance due to resource contention and churn. Due to the
time required and complexities in working with PlanetLab,
we limit the number of experiments we used it for, focusing
on the time required to join a private overlay.
C. Connecting to the Private Overlay
In this experiment, we seek to determine the overall time it
takes for a node to become connected to the public overlay,
and then for a subsequent pair node to become connected
to the private overlay. By connected, we mean a node has
a connection with the nodes whose IDs are closest in the ring
(i.e., neighbors with IDs both smaller than and larger than the
node who is joining). The results of this experiment show the
time it takes to connect to a public overlay, query the DHT
for private overlay information, and then connect to a private
overlay with and without security.
To summarize the connection process, we first start the
public node. Upon becoming connected, the private node first
inserts into the DHT its private overlay information using an
automated lease extender. Afterwards, we start the private node
and begin constantly querying the DHT key for information
from other nodes. As soon as this is retrieved from the DHT,
it is appended to the list of potential bootstrapping nodes
from which the bootstrapping state machine pulls addresses
from during the early connection phase. Once the private node
reaches a connected state, the test is terminated. The reason
for starting the private node after the public node was due in
part to earlier experiments, in which we noticed that starting
the public and private overlays at the same time took longer
due to the state machines in the private node using exponential
time back-offs of up to a minute when there were no nodes
in the bootstrapping node list.
For PlanetLab, we created several overlays with random
distribution of private nodes. We start from a base public
overlay of 600 nodes on distinct PlanetLab hosts, then had
each node randomly decide to join the private overlay in order
to obtain private overlays consisting of 5 to 600 members. To
verify the amount of private overlay nodes, we crawled the
private overlay network. The experiment entailed connecting
to the ring from the same physical location 100 times using a
different node ID each time, causing the node to join different
peers and creating a distribution of connection times. During
this process, we measured the time it took for the public node
and private nodes to become connected. To ensure that the
PlanetLab public overlay was fully connected, we waited an
hour prior to starting the experiments to provide enough time
for it to reach steady state. This is a conservative value; in our
experience with overlays we run on PlanetLab, pools of this
size form a complete ring in the order of minutes.
For Simulation, we followed similar steps though we were
able to tighten the exact amount of peers in both the public
and private overlays. We began with a pool of 700 public
nodes and 2 to 300 members in the private overlay. We then
waited for the overlays to become fully connected, whereupon
we waited 60 simulated minutes to ensure that the system
was at steady state, i.e., trimming unnecessary connections and
having a steady state machine. At which point, we added an
additional public node with a matching private node. We took
time snapshots of how long they took to become connected.
For the modeler, we repeated the steps done for the simu-
lation, though we were able to evaluate the timing of up to
100,000 nodes, so we performed evaluations to compare with
the PlanetLab and Simulation results as well as much larger
network sizes 7. For timing, we reviewed the typical connec-
tion steps when connecting to the public overlay, querying the
DHT, and then connecting to the private overlay using this
process as the basis for our evaluation.
Fig. 6. The time it takes for a single node joining a public overlay and then
a private overlay. Since the public overlay size is the same in all tests, we
averaged all results together for the individual evaluations. The format for the
legend is defined using the following convention: EnvironmentOverlay, where
the environment is PlanetLab, Simulator, or (Network) Modeler and overlay
is Base for public overlay, No for no security private overlay, and Sec for
security enabled private overlay. ModBase is network modeler Public overlay
connection time. SimSec is simulator security enabled private overlay.
Our results, Figures 6, 7 are well correlated with near iden-
tical slopes. In all cases the time to become connected with the
private overlay remains reasonable and scales logarithmically
as network size grows. Connection times differ amongst the
set, in the case of the Simulator all the state machines are at
the maximum wait delay due to lack of churn in the system,
whereas PlanetLab has limited overhead due to this delay,
and the modeler does not worry about state machine state,
churn, or bad connection attempts. An important result is that
PtP security does not significantly add to time to joining the
overlays, most likely due to the majority of the time being
occupied by overlay routing.
D. Instantaneous Pool Creation
In this experiment, we determine the amount of time re-
quired to bootstrap a private overlay including their matching
Fig. 7. The time it takes for a single node joining a public overlay and then
a private overlay. The X axis represents the number of peers in the private
overlay, whereas the lines themselves represent the number of peers in the
public overlay. The legend for the line consists of “number[s]”, where the
number represents the total numbers of peers in the public overlay and the
optional “s” specifies whether the private overlay is modeling security.
public overlay nodes using an existing network. We start with
a network size of 200 public nodes and then add the nodes that
will become part of the private overlay. Because PlanetLab is
difficult to control in terms of attempting to start 200 public
nodes simultaneously and ensuring that they do not restart
mid-experiment, we ran this experiment using the simulator.
Though we can state from previous experience, that using
PlanetLab, we typically see a network form within minutes
of the last host’s overlay software starting.
Fig. 8. The time to form private overlay using a public overlay with 200
nodes after simultaneously turning on various counts of private overlay nodes.
In Figure 8, we present our results with and without security
for various sized networks. The results present a slightly
different picture than the previous experiment. In this case,
there is a slightly logarithmic growth to the time it takes to
complete an overlay. As in the previous test, the use of security
has a small relative impact on the overall time to form the ring.
E. Measuring Bandwidth
In this experiment, we continued the overlay bootstrapped
in the previous experiment and measured the bandwidth con-
sumed for the 60 minutes, 60 minutes after the overlay was
well-formed. Reusing the simulation results changes no results
and cuts down on the most expensive part of the procedure,
the bootstrap phase. In this section, we present the network
bandwidth used by each process, see Figure 9.
As shown in Figure 9, when comparing the querying of
the DHT using static and dynamic timers, the static timer’s
Fig. 9. Bandwidth used in a systems with and without security during steady
state operations consisting of 200 public nodes and various sized paired public
/ private nodes. Those lines labeled “static” have DHT lists queried every 5
minutes whereas in “dynamic” queries are made using an exponential back-
off policy starting at 30 seconds up to a maximum of 60 minutes. Bandwidth
is in bytes / second, a negligible amount of bandwidth for DSL and Cable
Internet.
bandwidth is dominated by DHT queries. Since the system is
at steady state, i.e., no new nodes in the system, only a single
DHT query is made using dynamic timers. In both cases, the
time to form a complete ring as performed in Section V-D
is the same. The dynamic timer causes bandwidth to grow
slower than a logarithmic pace. Given that the bandwidth used
grows slowly, it appears that overlays in general use negligible
amounts of bandwidth and that even using security does not
increase it significantly.
In regards to selecting a proper timeout, it can logically be
surmised that if an existing public and private overlay were
going through heavy churn, there will always be a base of
nodes connected to each other. If because the DHT is currently
fragmented, a new node forms a partitioned private overlay, the
node should eventually and quickly find out about the original
overlay and reform the split overlays due to the continuous
queries. The advantage of the dynamic timeout is that it places
the weight for fixing ring partitions on the nodes that created
them rather than the older more stable nodes.
F. Evaluating Revocation Implementations
In Figures 10 and 12, we present the time required and
network traffic to perform a revocation using the simulator
and modeler, respectively. To evaluate the cost, we estimate
that the average size of a revocation is 300 bytes, which
includes information such as the user’s name, the group, time
of revocation, and a signature from the CA’s private key. For
the simulations, we determined the average bandwidth for the
30 seconds including the revocation as well as 30 seconds
where there was no activity. We chose this time sample,
because it was the smallest amount of time that would contain
a representative steady state bandwidth but also make the cost
of a revocation obvious. In the modeler, we only obtain total
bytes required for the operation because no connection based
steady state behavior is modeled.
The results seem to indicate that in terms of time, they
scale well together, though in network traffic the DHT scales
significantly better. The problem with the DHT approach is
Fig. 10. The time delay and bandwidth used during the time between
revoking a node and notifying nodes of the revocation using simulations.
(Broadcast has been abreviated to “Bcast”).
that it is inefficient for truly malicious peers. In the case of the
DHT, if a peer is revoked, it can attempt to connect with new
peers who have do not know of this revocation, each peer will
have to query the DHT. If this becomes the case, the DHT
method will quickly become more inefficient. On the other
hand, the broadcast cannot ensure that all nodes receive the
message, due to overlay network stability issues, peers may
not be included in the broadcast. As such the best approach
may be to store a revocation in the DHT but notify all peers
of a revocation via a broadcast.
Fig. 11. The time delay and bytes transferred during the time between
revoking a node and notifying nodes of the revocation using simulations.
(Broadcast has been abreviated to “Bcast”).
Fig. 12. Time required and bytes transferred during a modeled DHT and
broadcast revocation.
Broadcast is efficient with bandwidth, because the broadcast
forms a tree, which spans exactly N-1 connections. The
network traffic required to do a broadcast on this tree is the
minimum amount of communication necessary to reach all
nodes in the broadcast range.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a novel architecture for de-
ploying secure, private overlays in constrained environments
through the use of public overlays. The public overlay at a
minimum must provide a distributed data store, like a DHT,
so that peers of the private system can rendezvous with each
other. For constrained environments, we used NAT traversal
techniques including STUN and TURN with both private
and public overlays to support the relaying of packets. We
evaluated the use of DTLS in our system and determined
that security overhead does not provide significant overhead
during connection starting and idle periods. Most importantly,
we presented how a group infrastructure can be used as a
user-friendly and intuitive mechanism to create and maintain
private and secure overlays. For verification of usability, we
show that the time to become connected to the private overlay
occurs in less than 30 seconds and that the bandwidth required
from each peer while idling was insignificant, on the order of
100 bytes per second.
At this point in time our platform still has a few drawbacks.
Users that cannot host their own web servers on the Internet
are unable to use the group’s mechanism; this could be solved
by making a web site accessible via a VPN or directly through
the overlay. For each overlay, a peer will use more resources, to
reduce this, peers could multiplex a single socket for multiple
overlays reducing the thread count and open socket count.
Also it is important to note that the public overlay should
implement decentralized security techniques, otherwise access
to the private overlay will be hampered. For future work,
we envision applying this approach to social networks and
to establish multicast groups as done in [10].
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